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Renaissance perspective constructs objective reality from the viewpoint of a sovereign subject. 
The border protecting the sovereignty of this subject is sometimes crossed, in the Baroque, by 
means of the subject’s sudden awareness of the humanity of the other person and of our 
inescapable responsibility for that unique and irreplaceable other. With examples from music, 
painting, and literature, I discuss what I call “eruptions of the ethical Baroque.” These eruptions 
trouble the serenity of the arts and haunt us: one such eruption reveals, to the Christian warrior-
crusader Tancredi, the face of the apparently Muslim female warrior Clorinda, in Monteverdi’s 
Combattimento (1624); another reveals, to Abraham—in Rembrandt’s 1635 painting of “The 
Sacrifice of Isaac”— the face of his son Isaac and then suddenly interrupts what appeared to 
have been an imminent murder; another forces us to encounter, in Shakespeare’s disruptively 
sober prose, Shylock’s Jewish eyes; yet another, in Paul Celan’s 
arguably modern Baroque poem Tenebrae, interrupts—but too late, tragically—the profoundly 
enchanting pathos of François Couperin’s high Baroque choral masterpiece, Leçons de 
ténèbres, which inspired Celan’s poem. 
	  
	  
	  
What, exactly, is the Baroque? Modern theorists—such as Gilles Deleuze, with his 
notion of the fold—have discussed its significance and pondered the question of 
whether or not there is such a phenomenon as the Baroque.1 The word Baroque was 
not used by any of the artists and thinkers of the historical period—the seventeenth and 
early eighteenth centuries in Europe—sometimes referred to by this term. It was first 
used as a stylistic term in 1855 (by Jacob Burkhardt in the Cicerone and by William 
Luebke in his Geschichte der Architektur). Even its etymology is unclear. It is possibly 
derived from the Portuguese barroco, meaning “a rough or imperfectly shaped pearl,” or 
from the word baroco, a mnemonic term invented for the fourth mode of the second 
figure of formal logic, a term that conveys a sense of surprise and shock that seems, in 
fact, to defy logic. Both of these possible derivations convey something that, one still 
feels, goes to the heart of our sense of the Baroque. There is something disruptive 
about the Baroque. Classicism gives us proportion and decorum, the Baroque 
disproportion and the disruption of decorum, as the art historian Heinrich Wölfflin (d. 
1945) so pregnantly suggested in his book Renaissance and Baroque, first published in 
1888. 
One of the things that is disrupted in the Baroque is the stability, the autonomy 
	  
of the subject. When we think of Renaissance Humanism, we think of Pico’s famous 
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“Oration on the Dignity of Man” (1486). You are, Pico imagines God saying to man, 
“constrained by no limits, in accordance with your own free will… We have set thee at 
the world’s center that you may from there more easily observe whatever is in the 
world.”2 And we think of perspective in Renaissance painting, the world as object 
perceived by a sovereign subject, man or woman. In the Baroque, this sovereignty of the 
subject is sometimes disrupted by the Other, by the subject’s sudden awareness of the 
humanity of the other person, and of that subject’s inescapable responsibility for this 
unique and irreplaceable Other. For this special issue on political theology in the 
Baroque era, I will focus on how certain Baroque works of art call the very project of 
political theology into question. 
	  
	  
I. Tasso’s Gerusalemme Liberata and Monteverdi’s Combattimento 
	  
The Baroque, as I just mentioned, disrupts the sovereignty of the Renaissance 
subject. The Ethical Baroque disrupts, as well, what the political philosopher Carl 
Schmitt claims to be the very essence of politics: the distinction between friend and 
enemy, a distinction, according to Schmitt, that has nothing to do with “good and evil in 
the moral sphere.”3 What happens to the persuasiveness of this distinction when the 
enemy is your friend, even your lover? Let me explore this possibility by making 
reference to a musical example from Claudio Monteverdi, who is considered, in 
musicology, as composing at the beginning of the Baroque period. I shall discuss the 
passage that concludes Monteverdi’s Combattimento di Tancredi e Clorinda, a madrigal that 
was staged in Venice in 1624, eleven years after the composer moved to Venice to 
become maestro di cappella at San Marco. The Combattimento is a setting of some stanzas 
from Tasso’s epic poem of the Counter-Reformation, the Gerusalemme liberata (1575). 
We should recall here that, for the great art historian Heinrich Wölfflin, Tasso’s 
Jerusalem Delivered was exemplary of the Baroque, as opposed to Ariosto’s Orlando 
Furioso, which Wölfflin associated with the Renaissance.4 
Tasso’s Jerusalem Delivered, as musicologist David Schulenberg writes, “was a 
romanticised poetic account of the First Crusade (1095-99), during which Jerusalem and 
other parts of the Holy Land were seized from their Arab Muslim rulers by Western 
Roman Catholic nobles. In the scenes set by Monteverdi, one of the Western knights, 
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Tancredi, is in pursuit of Clorinda, a Muslim warrior. Unbeknownst to Tancredi, 
Clorinda is a woman in disguise; moreover, he has previously been in love with her…. 
The second encounter is fatal to Clorinda…; as she dies they recognize one another. In 
that moment, Clorinda accepts Tancredi’s love and is converted to Christianity; she asks 
him to baptize her, which he does with water from a nearby stream.”5 Tasso’s poem, at 
least on the surface, is the Catholic Counter-Reformation poem par excellence. The 
intended Christian triumphalist message of Tasso’s verse is clear enough, but the poet 
complicates and even undermines this triumphalism with his articulation of an 
extraordinary empathy for the vanquished Clorinda. 
In Monteverdi’s setting, the musical focus is not on the possible reunion of the 
lovers in some hypothetical afterlife. The focus is, rather, clearly on Clorinda’s death, on 
the void felt by Tancredi in the death—at first imminent, and then absolutely realized—
of the woman he loves and whom he unwittingly kills in battle. Clorinda, an Ethiopian 
and an apparently Muslim woman whose identity has yet to be revealed, has just asked 
Tancredi to seek water from a nearby spring to baptize her as a Christian before she 
dies: 
A little way off in a cranny of the mountain a tiny streamlet had its 
murmuring source. There he ran and filled his helmet in the spring, and 
sorrowing returned to the noble and reverend rite. He felt his hand 
trembling while it freed and revealed the face as yet unknown. He saw it. 
He knew it. And remained without voice or motion. Alas the sight! alas 
the recognition! [Ahi vista! ahi conoscenza!] 
	  
	  
He did not die outright [Non morì già:]6; rather he summoned up for the 
moment all his powers and set them to guard his heart; and repressing 
his grief he bent his efforts to giving her life with water whom with the 
sword he killed. While he released the sound of the holy words, she was 
with joy transfigured, and smiled: and through the act of her joyful and 
living death, she seemed to say: “Heaven is opening; I depart in peace.”7 
Here is the conclusion of Monteverdi’s Combattimento and the words from Tasso’s text 
	  
that the composer has set to music: 
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Figure 1: Ending of Il combattimento di Tancredi e Clorinda 
	  
[Audio Example 1: Combattimento Finale] 
	  
Ahi vista! ahi conoscenza! 
Non morì già, ché sue virtuti accolse 
tutte in quel punto, e in guardia al cor le mise, 
e premendo il suo affanno, a dar si volse 
vita con l’acqua a chi co’l ferro uccise. 
mentre egli il suon de’ sacri detti sciolse, 
colei di gioia trasmutossi, e rise; 
e in atto di morir lieta e vivace, 
	  
dir parea: “S’apre il ciel; io vado in pace. 
	  
After the word “parea” (“seemed”), Monteverdi’s annotations read: “this last note is 
bowed [so as to] die away [questa ultimata nota va in arcata morendo].” Clorinda’s Islamic 
otherness has been assimilated into the dominant religion of an early seventeenth- 
century Venice that was still proudly conscious of the Christian defeat of the Muslim 
Turks at the Battle of Lepanto in 1571. 
For all the overt Christian triumphalism of Tasso’s verse, Monteverdi’s setting 
	  
evoked compassion in his audience of Venetian nobility for the vanquished former 
Muslim of Tasso’s poem. As Silke Leopold informs us, the “type of cultivated 
entertainment” represented by this particular madrigal “required a happy ending.”8 The 
audience was not quite prepared for the sad ending of the Combattimento. Monteverdi 
himself comments that those attending the performance in the palace of Girolamo 
Mocenigo (the Hotel Danieli in today’s Venice) one evening during the carnevale in 1624 
“were so moved by the emotion of compassion (dal’ affeto di compassione) that they 
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almost shed tears.”9 True to what Monteverdi describes as his seconda pratica, in which 
the music is at the service of the poetic text, the composer brings out—and further 
deepens—the emotional complexities of Tasso’s verse. The Other—the apparently 
Muslim enemy on the battlefield—is baptized as a Christian just before she dies, it is 
true, but any simple-minded Christian triumphalism is counterbalanced and even 
overwhelmed by a pathos for the vanquished and of a love irretrievably lost. Moreover, 
there is no indication, in the parts of the Gerusalemme liberata excerpted by Monteverdi, 
that Clorinda had in fact been born a Christian, as Tasso describes to his readers. In the 
Combattimento, she appears to be a Muslim, pure and simple, before her conversion. 
A sense of violated otherness haunts Monteverdi’s setting. The words and the 
	  
music evoke an otherness that seems to exceed what the words and music represent. 
There is a sense of irresolution—Baroque irresolution—at the end of this piece. The 
Combattimento is remarkable for its series of stark contrasts in mood. As Eric T. Chafe 
observes, Monteverdi was fond of using the key of d minor “for the greatest flat/sharp 
juxtapositions and disparities.”10 The piece appears to be ending in this key of d minor, 
but with Clorinda’s expectation of rising into heaven “in peace” (in pace), her soprano 
voice ends with a shift from the darkness of d minor to the light of D major, the key in 
which the Combattimento begins. We expect the penultimate note on which she sings 
her final word (pace) to be an F, in a progression of a half-step from E to F, which would 
preserve the key of d minor, but the progression of another half-step from E to F sharp 
[see blue arrow pointing downwards in Figure 1] accomplishes a shift from the key of d 
minor to the key of D major. The penultimate note of F sharp, though announcing an 
officially triumphal shift to D major, nevertheless creates—with its unanticipated and 
haunting reach of an extra half step—a kind of dissonance or ambiguity. We feel 
precariously suspended, a suspension typical of Monteverdi, whose dissonances 
outraged more conventional musical minds like that of Giovanni Maria Artusi, and 
whose music as a whole is itself suspended between Renaissance modality and a later, 
more settled system of musical tonality. With Clorinda dead and her soprano voice 
departed, it is the spare instruments that bring us back again, somberly and almost 
silently, to the final tonic chord. 
There are discussions about heaven, in Tasso, following this passage. Clorinda, in 
Shankman, Ethical Baroque 6 	  
	  
	  
Tancredi’s dream, appears in heaven and looks forward to Tancredi’s eventually joining 
her there. But in Monteverdi’s madrigal, Tasso’s text ends before this scene. Without 
the certain promise of an afterlife, the martial violence of which Clorinda is the victim is 
far less palatable, the death of the other far more tragic. But Tasso’s arguably Baroque 
text, even without Monteverdi’s music, is haunted by the occluded other. As David 
Quint remarks: 
The dream [of Clorinda appearing in heaven, in a later passage of the 
	  
poem] comforts Tancredi, but in the celebrated episode of the enchanted 
forest that follows in the next canto, he is once again overcome by his 
guilt before the demonic simulacrum of Clorinda trapped in the bark of 
one of the forest’s trees… Clorinda is not so easily put to rest. 
Tancredi’s reaction suggests the bad conscience of Tasso’s epic, a chink in 
its ideological armor… [T]here is no hiding the punitive violence of 
Clorinda’s death—all the more naked and sadistically charged because of 
Tancredi’s love for the woman he unwittingly kills. Tancredi is the author 
of this violence, which seems to exceed containment by the poem’s 
politico-religious ideology; as a stand-in for the author Tasso, he at least 
casts a measure of doubt on the capacity of that ideology to resolve its 
own inner contradictions.11 
This exceeding of containment by ideology, or by politics, is an example of the 
	  
troubling eruption of what I am calling the Ethical Baroque. In my understanding of the 
Ethical Baroque, which is inspired by the work of Levinas, politics comes after ethics and 
often—perhaps even always—betrays ethics. Levinas insists on the primacy of the 
ethical relation, of the face-to-face. But my responsibility to the Other in the face-to- 
face relationship is not the last word, for there is also the third party (“le tiers”), and 
with the appearance of the third party comes society, law, and the state, i.e. the realm 
of politics. The subject is responsible for these other others as well, and this always 
poses the possibility, in the context of politics, of a certain betrayal of the face-to-face.12 
The strict maintenance of politics, at the expense of the ethics, makes transcendence 
before the face of the other an impossibility. Politics without ethics, for Levinas, is 
totalitarianism. 
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It is not only politics or ideology that is disrupted by this instance of the eruption 
of Ethical Baroque. Theology—the very concept of theology—is disrupted as well. 
Christian theology triumphs in this passage in Monteverdi and Tasso, but at the expense 
of life, at the expense of the life of the Other. Theological language, i.e. theo-logy, can, 
paradoxically, protect the subject who is speaking it from risking the possibility of the 
transcendence that, for Levinas, goes to the very core of what he considers to be true 
religiosity, which consists in a coring out [dénucléation] or a hollowing out of the ego by 
its concern for, its obsession with, the Other.13 As Levinas remarks, in a startling 
formulation, “theological language destroys the religious situation of transcendence.” 
Levinas goes on to say, “Language about God rings false or becomes a myth, that is, can 
never be taken literally.”14 What triumphs in this passage in Monteverdi and Tasso is 
what Walter Benjamin, in his essay “Critique of Violence,” refers to as mythic as 
opposed to divine violence, which Benjamin associates with the God of the Hebrew 
Bible. Mythic violence, for Benjamin, “is bloody power over mere life for its own sake; 
divine violence is pure power over all life for the sake of the living [emphasis mine].”15 
	  
	  
II. Walter Benjamin, Rembrandt, Shakespeare 
	  
Walter Benjamin theorized brilliantly—if often elusively—about the nature of the elusive 
concept of the Baroque in his early and seminal work, The Origin of German Tragic 
Drama, completed in 1925. Benjamin’s subject was the German Baroque Trauerspiel, the 
“mourning play,” from the era of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), a religious conflict 
between Catholics and Protestants. The Baroque Trauerspiel, in Susan Handelman’s 
formulation, “is a secularized form of medieval mystery play wherein history is no longer 
the story of redemption and where there is no longer any fulfilling eschatology.”16 
Baroque allegory, according to Benjamin, does not deliver its promised salvific 
	  
message. In terms of ethics, though, Baroque allegory is preferable, for Benjamin, to 
classicism and romanticism, for classical and romantic works of art—with their seamless 
unity of form and content—enchant us and thus cause us to forget our responsibilities 
to others. We enter into an eternal present when we experience classical and romantic 
works of art. Allegory, on the other hand, makes us aware of time, of diachrony (i.e. of 
change occurring over and through time). Its signifiers do not mean in and of 
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themselves. They rather point us in a certain direction. We must wait, in time, before 
what they point to is revealed, even if that revelation is frustrated, denied. Thus the 
baroque Trauerspiel, through allegory, breaks the spell of classical art, since in the 
Baroque we are not meant to be totally engrossed by the representation itself at the 
mimetic level. Baroque allegory then fails to deliver, however, on the redemptive 
message to which the allegory is pointing. The attempt to articulate a seamless 
connection between political and theological sovereignty is, according to Benjamin, 
undone by the baroque Trauerspiel itself. We are thus left with the ruins of an allegory 
which point to no redeeming truth, fragments that, however, awaken our sense of the 
catastrophe of history that we can only resist by assuming the responsibility to make 
remake our society in the image of justice. 
Benjamin’s messianism, his call to ethics and to justice, is implicit in his book on 
	  
the baroque Trauerspiel (written in 1925). In his remarks on the work of Sigmund von 
Birken (1626-1681), for example, Benjamin observes that “The mystical instant [Nu] 
becomes the ‘now’ [Jetzt] of contemporary actuality; the symbolic becomes distorted 
into the allegorical.”17 It is only later, in his reflections On the Concept of History (1940), 
that the messianic implications of the “now” [Jetzt] articulated in The Origin of German 
Tragic Drama become fully explicit through Benjamin’s notion of Jetztzeit (“now-time”). 
In these late reflections, Benjamin insists that the historian who “proceeds from this” 
now [Jetzt] “ceases to tell the sequence of events like the beads of a rosary. He grasps 
the constellation into which his own era has entered, along with a very specific earlier 
one. Thus, he establishes a conception of the present as now-time [Jetztzeit] shot 
through with splinters of messianic time.”18 What I am calling the Ethical Baroque thus 
eschews both a thoroughly enchanting and amoral classicism, on the one hand; and it 
eschews, as well, the reduction of the emotional and moral complexities of what it 
represents to an allegedly salvific allegorical meaning. 
Let me now offer two examples of eruptions of the Ethical Baroque, one from 
painting and the other from literature. 
Rembrandt’s painting The Sacrifice of Isaac (1635) hangs in the Hermitage in St. 
	  
Petersburg, Russia. In Genesis 22, God orders Abraham to take his only legitimate son, 
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Isaac, to the top of Mt. Moriah and to offer him there as a sacrifice to God. Abraham 
obeys and sets out on a three-day journey. When he nears the appointed place, he 
commands his two young servants to stay behind, and he gathers wood for the sacrifice, 
taking Isaac with him. Abraham builds the altar of sacrifice with the wood he had 
gathered. He binds Isaac’s hands and feet, places Isaac on top of the pile of wood, and he 
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then raises his arm to execute God’s command. The painting depicts the moment that 
follows from Genesis 22, specifically verses 10-12: 
Avraham stretched out his hand, 
he took the knife to slay his son. 
But YHWH’s messenger called to him from Heaven and said: 
Avraham! Avraham! 
He said: 
	  
Here I am. 
He said: 
Do not stretch out your hand against the lad, 
do not do anything to him.19 
Rembrandt’s painting dramatically depicts a moment of interruption epitomized 
by the knife that hangs suspended in the air, a baroque gesture that we do not find in 
 
	  
earlier pictorial depictions by Caravaggio in his The Sacrifice of Isaac (c. 1603) or by 
Rembrandt’s teacher, Pieter Lastman.20 In both the Caravaggio and in Lastman’s painting 
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The Sacrifice of Isaac (c. 1612), which Rembrandt knew, the knife remains firmly in 
Abraham’s hand, whereas in the Rembrandt canvas it hangs in mid-air, having been 
dropped by Abraham, whose right arm the angel has seized, thus interrupting the 
apparently imminent slaughter. Violence, figured by the suspended knife, is thus 
dramatically interrupted in Rembrandt’s powerful image, painted in the 1630s, at 
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precisely the moment when Rembrandt was proving himself to be a “virtuoso of 
interruption.”21 
Rembrandt’s 1635 painting of The Sacrifice of Isaac is true to the biblical text, 
which tells of how the messenger of God dramatically interrupts the imminent action 
with that form of the negative imperative (‘al [“do not”] plus the imperative) that, in 
Hebrew, is especially reserved for expressing immediately pressing, specific commands: 
“do not stretch out (tishlach-‘al) your hand”; “[and] do not do (ve ‘al-ta’as) anything to 
him.”22 At this stage in his career, Rembrandt was interested in rendering the dramatic, 
human aspect of biblical stories. His paintings from this period were very faithful to the 
biblical texts that inspired his visual renderings. 
In Rembrandt’s painting, Abraham has covered Isaac’s entire face with his left 
hand, suggesting at least two things. First, the father cannot bear to have the son he 
loves, his only legitimate son, actually witness his own father raising and lowering the 
knife that will enter his young and tender flesh and end his life. For Abraham to allow 
Isaac to witness the killing, despite the divine source of the command, no doubt filled 
Abraham with shame, as well as horror. Second, Abraham apparently cannot kill his son 
so long as he sees his son’s face. Indeed, in the account of the threatened sacrifice in the 
Qur’an, Abraham (Ibrahim, in Arabic), in order to fulfill God’s command, lays his son 
down prostrate on his forehead (liljabeeni 37.103).23 The implication here is that if 
Abraham were to look directly at his son’s face, he would not be able to kill him. In his 
commentary on this passage, al-Tabari (839-923) elucidates the significance of 
Abraham’s placing his son face down. According to al-Tabari, who cites a number of 
authorities, the son—it is unclear, in the Qur’anic account, whether this son is Ishmael 
or Isaac24—remarks to his father: “When you lay me down to sacrifice me, turn me with 
my face down; do not lay me on my side, for I fear that if you look at my face pity will 
overcome you and hold you back from carrying out God’s command.”25 The face, in its 
vulnerability—as Emmanuel Levinas is fond of remarking—speaks, and it says, “thou 
shalt not kill.”26 
The angel is looking directly at Isaac’s covered—or, as Simon Schama 
	  
perceptively observes, smothered—face.27 Abraham, who has avoided looking at Isaac’s 
face, now looks directly at the face of the angel, who almost dreamily gazes straight 
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ahead, neither at Abraham nor at Isaac. Who is this angel, this messenger of God who is 
the subject of Abraham’s sudden attention and towards whose gentle face the eyes of 
the patriarch are abruptly turned? And what is the significance of the interruption? I 
hope it is not too bold to suggest that the angel or messenger (mal’akh) of God is the 
face of the Other—in this case the face of Isaac—suddenly commanding Abraham not to 
kill him.28 In Rembrandt’s painting, the angel seems to be roughly the same age as Isaac, 
and his nose bears a marked similarity to Abraham’s, making it appear as if he is in fact 
Abraham’s son. As Levinas insists, “the face speaks.”29 God reveals himself only by the 
trace He leaves behind in the face of the Other.30 The face of the Other, for Levinas, is 
not really seen, is not experienced as part of the order of the visible. It is rather 
“heard,” as Abraham suddenly hears the voice of the angel speaking to him. 
Rembrandt’s painting represents this moment of interruption, which is captured 
not only in the sudden appearance of the angel and in Abraham’s suspended knife, but 
also in the “anguished face” of Abraham who, as Simon Schama finely remarks, has “the 
look of a madman unexpectedly paroled from hell.”31 If the viewer looks carefully and at 
close range at the Rembrandt canvas, tears of compassion can be seen to be trickling 
down Abraham’s face. In Caravaggio’s rather cruel rendering,32 Abraham seems grimly 
determined to slay his son and almost annoyed by the angel’s sudden interference. The 
viewer of the Caravaggio painting is struck more by Isaac’s vivid expression of absolute 
terror than by any sense of relief evident in the face of Abraham. Rembrandt’s painting, 
in contrast to Caravaggio’s, is a dramatic example of what I am calling an eruption of the 
Ethical Baroque. Abraham, hearing the voice of the messenger of God who is the face of 
the Other, experiences a transcendence of his own ego in the direction of ethics, as he 
responds to and takes responsibility for the Other whose face says “thou shalt not kill.” 
The shadow of allegory is present in Rembrandt’s 1635 painting of “The Sacrifice 
of Isaac,” it is true. The quality of Isaac’s flesh perhaps recalls a contemporary 
Rembrandt painting of Christ descending from the cross. But “The Sacrifice of Isaac,” as 
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I have been arguing, gives us a vivid scene from the Hebrew Bible. It is not a sacrifice of 
the otherness, of the alterity of the text of the Hebrew Bible, at the altar of Christian 
supercessionism. Just as Monteverdi’s madrigal and Tasso’s poetic text are haunted by 
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the occluded face (la fronte [GL 12.67. 5] of Clorinda) of the Other, so here Rembrandt’s 
painting is haunted by the occluded face of Isaac, who appears as the face of the 
messenger of God. 
Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice (1596/1597) was written twenty years after 
	  
Tasso’s Jerusalem Delivered. The Romantically inclined literary critics of Benjamin’s day 
saw Shakespeare as the great master of naturalism. Benjamin, however, reads 
Shakespeare in the light—or darkness—of the German Baroque Trauerspiel. Benjamin 
insists on our seeing how the art of Shakespeare’s time was steeped in allegory. 
Benjamin writes, “in Shakespeare allegory reaches much deeper than the metaphorical 
forms where Goethe noticed it: ‘Shakespeare is rich in wonderful figures of speech, 
which arise from personified concepts and which would not be at all suitable nowadays, 
but which are entirely in place in his work because in his day all art was dominated by 
allegory….’“ The “Sturm und Drang” movement, as well as German Romanticism, 
according to Benjamin, “had eyes only for the elemental aspect of his work, not the 
allegorical.” 33 
For Benjamin, Shakespearean drama is tied both to the mimetic, or naturalistic, 
	  
to what Benjamin calls the “elemental,” and to the allegorical. Benjamin continues, “what 
is characteristic of Shakespeare is precisely that both aspects are equally essential. Every 
elemental utterance of the creature acquires significance from its allegorical existence, 
and everything allegorical acquires emphasis from the elemental aspect of the world of 
the senses.”34 
Hence, according to Benjamin, there is a tension between allegory and symbol in 
Shakespeare. In The Merchant of Venice, Shylock possesses, in part, an allegorical 
existence. He is an allegory representing the allegedly Jewish letter of the law, the old 
law, what Christians have traditionally referred to as the Old Testament. And yet 
Shylock is alive, he is human. He is vividly elemental, wishing to break free of the 
conceptual patterns that had rendered Jews as mere allegories, as literalist letters 
pointing to the Christian spirit, mere prefigurations of Christian truth with no 
otherness, no alterity of their own. 
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As an example of an eruption of the Ethical Baroque, where Shylock’s elemental 
humanity bursts free of its allegorical container, consider the moment in the play when 
Shylock asks his famous question “Hath not a Jew eyes?” 
Salerio has just asked Shylock why he bears such ill will towards the merchant of 
	  
Venice, Antonio (III. i. 50-69). Shylock responds: 
	  
He hath disgraced me, and hinder’d me half a million, laughed at my 
losses, mocked at my gains, scorned my nation, thwarted my bargains, 
cooled my friends, heated mine enemies—and what’s his reason? I am a 
Jew. Hath not a Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, 
senses, affections, passions? —fed with the same food, hurt with the same 
weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, 
warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer as a Christian is? If 
you prick us, do we not bleed? If you tickle us, do we not laugh? If you 
poison us, do we not die?35 
We might well view Shylock’s remark “Hath not a Jew eyes?” as the flickering instant in 
	  
the play when the possibility of the equivalent humanity of Christian and Jew is explicitly 
raised by Shakespeare, an insight that, one senses, lies at the very heart of the drama, 
despite its often apparently overt anti-Semitism. 
In a relatively early essay entitled “Reality and its Shadow” (1948), Emmanuel 
	  
Levinas sees Shakespeare as one of the sources of modern literature’s awareness of 
“the fundamental insufficiency of artistic idolatry.”36 Note that, for Levinas, modernity 
begins with the Baroque period—i.e. with the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries. Levinas associates artistic idolatry with poetry, and prose with conversation, 
with the opening inspired by the face of the other. He writes in Totality and Infinity: 
To poetic activity… in a dionysiac mode… is opposed the language that 
at each instant dispels the charm of rhythm…. Addressing the other [“le 
discours”] is rupture…, [a] breaking of rhythm, which enraptures and 
transports the interlocutors—prose.37 
It is perhaps no coincidence that the one moment of potential transcendence in The 
	  
Merchant of Venice occurs in prose. Shylock has, in Levinas’ terms, been “thematized” (or 
essentialized) as a Jew, and such relentless thematization and allegorization has stunted 
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and perverted his humanity, which nonetheless can still be glimpsed in his face, his eyes, 
which are now demanding to be seen not as allegory but—to evoke Benjamin’s term—
as element. Shakespeare’s transition to prose from his vintage pentameter line gets him 
as close as he can, in a representation, to signifying the elemental, the human. With the 
phrase “Hath not a Jew eyes?”, the Ethical Baroque erupts, in prose, and breaks the 
Dionysiac spell created by the Shakespearean pentameter. 
	  
	  
III. Baroque Modernity: Couperin’s Leçons de ténèbres and Celan’s 
	  
Tenebrae 
	  
Are eruptions of the Ethical Baroque limited to what is conventionally referred to as the 
Baroque period—to the late 16th through the early 18th centuries of European culture? 
There are those who, like Christine Buci-Glucksmann and Mieke Bal, have argued that 
the aesthetics of modernity are essentially baroque.38 Is there a modern Baroque? Might 
Paul Celan’s later poems be described as instances of the modern Baroque, especially if 
we understand Baroque art as a site of what I have been referring to as the eruption of 
ethics, of what Levinas calls the humanism of the Other (l’humanisme de l’autre homme)? 
Let us turn to one of Celan’s poems, Tenebrae, a poem he composed in 1957 and 
that was inspired by a piece of Baroque music—a piece not from the disruptive 17th 
Century but from the more classicizing high Baroque of the 18th Century. My argument 
is that Celan’s poem disrupts and redirects the pathos we feel as a result of the artistic 
spell cast by Couperin’s extraordinarily moving, and yet densely lacquered, late baroque 
work, the Leçons de ténèbres. 
The poet first drafted his poem Tenebrae in Paris in March 1957 after he had 
heard a performance of the extraordinarily moving Leçons de ténèbres of François 
Couperin (1668-1733), who composed the work sometime between 1713 and 1719 to 
accompany the Office of the Tenebrae during the Catholic Holy Week. The text, 
ascribed by Jewish and Christian tradition to Jeremiah, is a passionate lament on the fall 
of Jerusalem (586 B.C.E.) and an exhortation to repentance and to meditation. The first 
verse (in the Vulgate), following the “Incipit” reads: Quomodo sedet sola civitas plena 
populo (“How doth the city sit solitary that was full of people”.39 
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[Audio Example 2: “Incipit”] 
[Audio Example 3: “Aleph”] 
	  
	  
The solitude of the devastated city points forward, typologically, to the solitude of Jesus, 
whose disciples have parted from him, one by one, just before his arrest and subsequent 
death by crucifixion. The liturgical practice of dark [tenebrae] masses such as this one 
expresses, ritually, this abandonment of Jesus. At the beginning of these lamentations, 
thirteen candles are burning.  Twelve of these candles are then extinguished, one by 
one, symbolizing the twelve disciplines who left Jesus, one after another. At the 
conclusion, there is only one lit candle left, and this symbolizes the abandoned Jesus and 
the belief that the only road to salvation is through Him. 
The Lamentations of Jeremiah, when read typologically, is thus cut loose, in 
	  
Couperin’s piece, from the historical situation to which the Hebrew text refers, which is 
the destruction of the first Temple in Jerusalem by the Babylonians in 586 BCE. The 
Lamentations of Jeremiah is the text read and meditated upon during the liturgical 
service held on Tisha B’av, the ninth day of the month of Av, the most mournful day of 
the Jewish calendar. Tisha B’av traditionally commemorates the destruction of the first 
and second Temples, both of which were destroyed—remarkably—on the same day of 
the Jewish calendar, the ninth of Av: the first Temple in 586 BCE, as I have just 
mentioned, and the second by the Romans in 70 CE. One of the catastrophes 
remembered today on Tisha B’Av is the most catastrophic of catastrophes for the 
Jewish people, the Shoah or Holocaust. Hence, it is fitting that Celan, in Tenebrae, 
meditates upon the Shoah and, in effect, returns the Lamentations of Jeremiah to a 
Jewish context. But more than this: Celan suggests how allegorical thinking itself—how 
typology—can be a source of violence against the Other. 
Allegory can be cruel, especially typological allegory. Traditional Christian 
	  
typology stipulates that the text of the Hebrew Bible is valuable—is indeed invaluable—
insofar as it points forward to the New Testament. The Hebrew Bible, including the 
Lamentations of Jeremiah, is assimilated into the new dispensation. The danger here is 
that the Hebrew text will be denied its alterity, its otherness, and Jews are denied 
theirs. Here we have the doctrine of supercessionism, i.e. that idea that, as 
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the great modern philosopher Hegel held, Christianity has turned Judaism into a 
historical necessity that is, at the same time, a contemporary anachronism, indeed a 
scandal. This officially changed with Vatican II (1965), but Celan wrote Tenebrae (1957) 
nearly a decade before Vatican II. 
After attending a performance of Couperin’s moving work with his wife Gisèle, 
	  
who was raised a Catholic, Celan wrote Tenebrae: 
[Audio Example 4: Celan, Tenebrae] 
Near we are, Lord, 
	  
near and graspable. 
	  
	  
	  
Grasped already, Lord, 
clawed into each other, as if 
each of our bodies were 
your body, Lord. 
	  
	  
Pray, Lord, 
pray to us, 
we are near. 
	  
	  
Windblown we went there, 
went there to bend 
down to the trough and the crater. 
Went to the watering-hole, Lord. 
It was blood, it was 
what you shed, Lord. 
	  
	  
It shone. 
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It cast your image into our eyes, Lord. 
	  
Eyes and mouth stand so open and void, Lord. 
We have drunk, Lord. 
The blood and the image that was in the blood, Lord. 
	  
	  
	  
Pray, Lord, 
We are near.40 
	  
	  
Nah sind wir, Herr, 
nahe und greifbar. 
	  
	  
Gegriffen schon, Herr, 
ineinander verkrallt, als wär 
der Leib eines jeden von 
uns dein Leib, Herr. 
	  
	  
Bete, Herr, 
bete zu uns, 
wir sind nah. 
	  
	  
Windschief gingen wir hin, 
gingen wir hin, uns zu bücken 
nach Mulde und Maar. 
	  
	  
Zur Tränke gingen wir, Herr. 
	  
	  
	  
Es war Blut, es war, 
was du vergossen, Herr. 
	  
	  
Es glänzte. 
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Es warf uns dein Bild in die Augen, Herr. 
	  
Augen und Mund stehn so offen und leer, Herr. 
Wir haben getrunken, Herr. 
Das Blut und das Bild, das im Blut war, Herr. 
	  
	  
	  
Bete, Herr. 
Wir sind nah. 
	  
	  
What “shone,” what appeared in the “image” (Bild) of the blood shed by Christ in 
Celan’s poem is, in part, the widely held conception that the Jews were responsible for 
Christ’s Crucifixion. In the Judaic conception (Genesis 1:26), man is made in God’s 
image (   zelem). Man thus shares in God’s divinity. The persecution of the Jews and 
	  
of Christ are, on the one hand, reflections of each other: the Jews participate in 
communion, they drink Christ’s blood in so far that they, like the Jewish Jesus, are 
persecuted and murdered. The Jews have thus continually drunk the blood of Christ 
(Wir haben getrunken, Herr, l. 19). They have been forced to drink—and thereby to 
consume and to annihilate—the “image” (Bild is the common translation, in the German 
Bible, of the Hebrew zelem of Genesis 1. 26-27;41 this is how Buber and 
Rosenzweig translate the Hebrew word) of the divine that is supposedly contained in 
their own faces, which they see reflected in the blood they are about to drink before 
they die. The Jews have drunk the blood, and they have also drunk “the image that was 
in the blood (das Bild, das im Blut war, l. 20),” which I take to mean the conception, the 
idea—that has “shone” for over two millennia, and that is at the root of Christian anti- 
Semitism—that the Jews are responsible for Christ’s death. This idea that has shone, 
that has glistened, has, in its icy conceptuality, been the source of hatred and of 
murderous violence against Jews. 
Christ’s blood shone, and “Es warf uns dein Bild in die Augen, Herr (It cast your 
	  
image into our eyes, Lord).” The Lord to whom this line is addressed is both God and 
Jesus. Too often, when a Christian looks into the eyes of a Jew, Celan suggests, he sees 
not the image of God, but “dein Bild, Herr (your image, Lord),” that is, the image of 
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Christ crucified by the Jews. The Jews are not perceived as fully human, as made in 
God’s image. Rather, they are reduced to the status of animals drinking from a trough. 
The Catholic Encyclopedia of 1912 reports that the religious service of Tenebrae 
terminates “with the close of the day in order to signify the setting of the sun of justice 
and the darkness of the Jewish people who knew not our lord and condemned him to 
the gibbet of the cross.”42 Hath not a Jew eyes? Apparently not, if, when a Christian 
looks into the eyes of a Jew, he sees not a human being but an image of the darkness of 
disbelief and of responsibility for the Crucifixion of Jesus. In Tenebrae, Celan recovers 
the Jewish faces that the persecutors of the Jews—blinded by the image (das Bild) they 
had of the Jews—refused to see: Augen und Mund stehn so offen und leer, Herr (“Eyes and 
mouth stand so open and void, Lord”). 
Here we have a powerful description of the faces of the Jewish prisoners that we 
	  
recall from those horrifying photographs of stacks of emaciated corpses piled on one 
top of the other, often with their eyes and mouths opened wide, vacant, as if pleading 
for help that, were it miraculously to come, would come too late. In Celan’s recording 
of the poem, we clearly hear the vulnerable openness of that last syllable, that last word, 
which echoes the first word of the poem: “nah.” 
These are the Jewish faces that Celan believed had been effaced, first by 
	  
Christian allegory, where the Lamentations of the Hebrew Prophet Jeremiah were 
assimilated, in Latin, into the Tenebrae service of the Catholic Holy Week; and then, as 
the murderous logic continued in the history of modern Europe, violently assimilated to 
the point of extermination by National Socialism. 
Eruptions of the Ethical Baroque, which disrupt the serenity of art and haunt us: 
	  
eruptions which reveal the face of Clorinda, in both Tasso’s Jerusalem Delivered and 
Monteverdi’s Combattimento di Tancredi e Clorinda; an eruption that reveals, to 
Rembrandt’s Abraham, the face of his son Isaac and which thus interrupts what 
appeared to have been an imminent murder; an eruption which forces us to encounter, 
in disruptively sober prose, Shylock’s Jewish eyes; and which, in Celan’s arguably 
modern Baroque poem Tenebrae, interrupts—but too late, tragically—the profoundly 
enchanting pathos of Couperin’s Leçons de ténèbres. 
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